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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(h)(1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in using the period of time of the parties' two

marriages when determining a length of time for the award of alimony in the parties'
second divorce action. The trial court's adequacy of findings presents a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,122, 974 P.2d 306; Endrodv v.
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in its application of "extenuating

circumstances" standards consistent with Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5(7)(h) by
finding as extenuating circumstances for ordering alimony for a period of time longer
than the length of the second marriage, a long term marriage including the first marriage,
wife's need for alimony, and husband's ability to pay alimony.

The trial court's

interpretation of a statute is a question of law, reviewed for correctness, without deference
to the trial court. Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation. 896 P.2d 632, 633
(Utah 1995); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App.
1991).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 16, 2001, this case came before the trial court on remand from the
Court of Appeals, Kellev v. Kellev, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171, for determination of
the remaining issues of (a) allocating the property acquired by the parties during their
period of common law marriage in accordance with the approach set forth in Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d at 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and (b) the entry of further findings addressing
whether extenuating circumstances exist to justify an award of alimony beyond the fiveyear duration of the common law marriage. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on Remand from the Court of Appeals on July 16, 2002 and
Judgment on Remand on July 29, 2002 which reallocated property between the parties
and awarded monthly alimony of $3,000.00 to Sonia Kelley from December, 1998 for a
period of ten years, or until the remarriage or death of the petitioner, whichever occurs
first, based on findings of extenuating circumstances. (R. 1833-1846; R. 1847-1848).
Wayne Kelley filed aNotice of Appeal on August 13, 2002. (R. 1851-1852).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sonia Kelley and Wayne Kelley were first married on May 24, 1980 and divorced

pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce in July 1994. (R. 1834.) They subsequently entered
into a common law marriage with each other, separated in June 1996, and were divorced
pursuant to Decree of Divorce entered July 22, 1999. (R. 1670, 1679.)
2.

In the Decree of Divorce terminating the common law marriage, Wayne was

ordered to pay monthly child support of $2,000.00 and monthly alimony of $3,000.00. These

2

amounts were based on Wayne's historical earnings of $10,000.00 per month and Sonia's gross
earnings of $1,486.00 per month. (R. 1847.) Alimony was ordered to continue for a period of
time commencing December 1998 for a period of 16 years, or until such time as Petitioner
remarried or cohabitated, or upon the death of either party. The court based the length of
alimony upon the parties' total length of marriage, finding that the marriage existed beginning in
1980 until 1996. (R. 1684.)
3.

Wayne Kelley appealed the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals

issued its ruling in Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171.
4.

Within its written decision the Court of Appeals determined that the parties hereto

had entered into a common law marriage as of July 1994 that was ended by the Decree of
Divorce in July 1999. The Court of Appeals then remanded this case with specific instructions to
the trial court to enter further findings, if any there were, that would support a legal conclusion
that extenuating circumstances existed to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Annotated
section 30-3-5(7)(h). Absent adequate findings, the Court of Appeals ruled that the duration of
alimony under the current decree would be limited to five years. (Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT
App236,Tfl5&37,9P.3dl71.)
5.

The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's finding of changed

circumstances that allowed for modification of the first decree from 1994 and held that
there was no statutory or precedental basis for a finding that remarriage to the former
spouse was in any way materially different than remarriage to a third party for purposes
of termination of alimony. (Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, ^9, 9 P.3d 171.)

3

6.

On remand, the trial court found that the parties had been married in either a

solemnized or unsolemnized marriage for a total of 18 years. (R. 1842.) The trial court
concluded that the extenuating circumstances that existed to justify extending alimony
beyond the term of the common law marriage included (1) the long duration of the
parties5 marriage; (2) the standard of living to which the Petitioner and the parties'
children had become accustomed; (3) the needs of Petitioner and her inability to make
more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) Respondent's ability to make substantially more
than Petitioner. (R. 1845-46.) The trial court then ordered alimony for a period often
years from 1998 (R. 1848.)

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by finding that the parties had been married continually for a
period of 18 years in both marriages and using that finding to support an alimony award
of longer than the duration of the second marriage. The trial court's finding of a longterm marriage was based upon the parties' two separate marriages, the solemnized
marriage from 1980 through 1994, and the parties' common law marriage from 1994
through 1999. The trial court found that because the parties were married for a long
duration by virtue of two marriages, the award of alimony in the second marriage would
not be limited to the length of the second marriage. The trial court's use of the length of
the first marriage in conjunction with the length of the second marriage to award alimony
was in error.
The trial court's cumulative findings of fact of the length of the parties' marriage,
the needs of the recipient spouse, the standard of living of the parties, and the payor's
spouse's ability to pay alimony, are inadequate to support the legal conclusion that
extenuating circumstances existed to support an award of alimony longer than the length
of the parties' marriage. The trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to support its
legal conclusion that an award of alimony for a long duration is justified when the trial
court failed to make any findings beyond those that it made in the Decree of Divorce of
the common law marriage. The trial court's failure to make adequate and specific
findings to support its conclusions of law is error and thus, the award of alimony for
longer than five years should be reversed.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ALIMONY BASED
UPON THE TOTAL TIME OF THE PARTIES9 TWO MARRIAGES
RATHER THAN FIVE YEAR LENGTH OF THE SECOND
MARRIAGE AS INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS

The trial court's legal conclusion that because Sonia and Wayne Kelley were
married a total of more than eighteen years, from 1980 through July of 1999 there should
be an award of alimony for longer than the duration of the second marriage was in error.
The trial court, within its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on remand,
specifically found that the parties had been married in either a solemnized or
unsolemnized manner from 1980 through 1999 and determined that because the parties
had a long term relationship, alimony should be for a period of time longer than the
length of the second marriage. However, the Court of Appeals had remanded this matter
to the trial court to "limit the duration of alimony under the current decree to five years".
Kellev v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, Tf37, 9 P.3d 171. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that "[b]ecause Sonia entered a new marriage at the time of the first divorce decree was
entered, the remarriage terminated her right to alimony from the first marriage." Id at
^36. The Court of Appeals ruled specifically that the duration of the common law
marriage was limited to five years and instructed the trial court to limit the duration of the
alimony to five years unless the trial court made adequate findings of extenuating
circumstances.
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The trial court's findings are inconsistent with its conclusion that the parties were
married for a long duration. In the divorce trial on the common law marriage, the trial
court recognized that the first marriage and divorce was a separate entity from the divorce
on the common law marriage. The trial court considered all other arguments raised by
Sonia to set aside the prior divorce and/or to modify the prior divorce decree entered in
1994. The trial court declined to do so finding that the parties intended the divorce to be
actual and each had knowledge of what they were doing. Additionally, the trial court
found that no fraud was perpetrated despite Soma's invitation to make such a finding.
The trial court was affirmed in so holding by the Court of Appeals. In the trial on
remand, the trial court continued to recognize the first marriage and divorce as a separate
entity from the common law marriage when it found that property awarded to Sonia in the
in the original divorce decree became her separate property during the common law
marriage. (R. 1835.) Nevertheless, the trial court failed to follow the Court of Appeals'
directive on remand and used, as a basis for concluding that extenuating circumstances
existed so as to justify an award of alimony for a period of time longer than the duration
of the common law marriage, facts that were wholly unsupported by its own findings
from two trials.
The trial court's finding that the duration of the marriage included both the
solemnized marriage plus the common law marriage and conclusion that this fact created
an extenuating circumstance was an error in law. The trial court's legal conclusion that
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extenuating circumstances existed to justify an award of alimony for a period longer than
the duration of the common law marriage was erroneous and should be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S "EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES"
USED TO JUSTIFY ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD OF TIME
LONGER THAN THE MARRIAGE ARE INADEQUATE

On remand, the trial court was directed to enter further findings addressing
whether extenuating circumstances existed as required by Utah Code Annotated section
30-3-5(7)(h). This statute provides that, "Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years a marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony
for a longer period of time." Extenuating circumstances sufficient to extend the alimony
period beyond the duration of the marriage must be explicitly stated within the trial
court's findings of fact. Rehn v. Rehn. 1999 UT App 41, ^|14, 363 P.2d 306.
In its conclusions of law on remand, the court determined that the parties' long
term marriage, Soma's standard of living, her inability to earn more than $1,486.00 per
month, and Wayne's ability to make more income than Sonia were extenuating
circumstances that justified alimony for a longer period of years than the common law
marriage.

The trial court did not make any additional findings regarding any other

circumstances to justify an award longer than the length of the marriage. In every award
of alimony, the trial court is required to consider certain factors, including "the financial
condition of the recipient spouse, the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income, the ability of the payor spouse to provide support, and the length of the
8

marriage." U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(a)(i-iv) (2001). The trial court also has discretion to make
a determination of an alimony award because of its advantaged position to assess
evidence and ascertain facts. Willey v. Willev, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997)(citing Owen v.
Owen. 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978)). "However, the trial court in exercising its
discretion must make findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions." IcL at
230 (citing Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193, 1994 (Utah 1985)). In this case, the
trial court made specific findings of fact in regard to the award of alimony —length of
marriage, needs of the recipient spouse, and ability of the payor spouse to pay —then
concluded that these findings supported a legal conclusion of extenuating circumstances.
The trial court's findings do not support its legal conclusion of extenuating
circumstances, they only support its legal conclusion of the underlying award of alimony,
i.e., alimony is appropriate and the amount, and are consistent, if not identical, to its
findings in the divorce action prior to remand. The trial court failed to make explicit
findings of fact to support its legal conclusion of extenuating circumstances, see Rehn at
Tf30, and specifically failed to make findings as to why the mandate of the remanding
court should not be followed.
In the findings on the common law marriage trial, the trial court found that prior to
the divorce the standard of living was one in which Wayne would give Sonia $7,500.00
per month to pay bills, that Wayne had a combined income of $18,000.00 per month and
there was no change in the financial arrangements following the divorce. (R. 1663) In
the remand findings, the court simply repeated its previous findings that Wayne continued
9

to provide Sonia with $7,500.00 per month to meet family expenses, that her house
payment was $2,400.00 per month, and that Sonia and the children continued to live in
the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. (R. 1842). These findings made by
the trial court on remand do not explicitly support its conclusion that there are extenuating
circumstances to justify an award of alimony longer than five years.
There was no testimony or other evidence of extenuating circumstances upon
which the trial court could make adequate findings. Out of 151 pages of transcript from
the remand trial, only four are dedicated to the crucial question of whether extenuating
circumstances extending the term for the payment of alimony existed. At one point when
Sonia testified about her employment status, Wayne's attorney Martin Custen asked the
court about the relevance of her present work status. In response, the court noted, "I'm
sure it has something to do with her ability and whether there are any extenuating
circumstances that may apply to the alimony issue." Upon cross-examination, Sonia
testified she received $5,000.00 per month, she had been found capable of earning
$1,458.00 per month and Wayne had imputed earnings of $10,000.00 per month. (August
16, 2001 Bench Trial Transcript, pp. 142-146.) There was no testimony as to any other
aspect that would constitute an extenuating circumstance. None of this testimony added
information to support a finding of extenuating circumstances. Upon remand, the trial
court failed to make adequate additional findings to support extenuating circumstances
and thus, the award of alimony for a period of time longer than the five-year common law
marriage was in error and should be reversed.
10

CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that the cumulative total years of the parties' first and
second marriages justified an award of alimony for a period longer than the length of the
second marriage was error. The award of alimony for a period of ten years from 1998
should be reversed and set at a maximum of five years.
The trial court's findings of "extenuating circumstances" to justify an award of
alimony longer than the length of the second marriage were inadequate. The trial court's
findings were limited to the findings to support the award of alimony and the trial court
failed to make any specific findings to support its conclusion that extenuating
circumstances existed. The award of alimony for a period often years from 1998 should
be reversed and set at a maximum of five years.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J<f_ day of May, 2003
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James C. Haskins (#1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P C .
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY (DIVISION I)
STATE OF UTAH

SONIA KELLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON REMAND FROM THE
COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner,
VS.

Civil No. 944700827

WAYNE KELLEY,
Respondent.

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

This case is before the Court on remand from the Court of Appeals, Kelley v.
Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), wherein the Court of Appeals affirmed this
Court's decision is certain respects and reversed on others. On remand, the only
remaining issues are (1) the proper allocation of the properties acquired by the parties
during the term of their common law marriage; and (2) whether "extenuating
circumstances" justify an award of alimony to the Petitioner for a period of time longer
than the five year term of the common law marriage.

These issues were tried before

the Court on August 16, 2001, with James C. Haskins, of Haskins & Associates, P.C.,

t YXx

representing the Plaintiff Sonia Kelley and Martin W. Custen representing the
Respondent, Wayne Kelley. The Court, having considered the evidence submitted at
the trial of this case as well as the evidence submitted at trial on remand, together with
the post-trial memoranda of the parties, and having entered its Memorandum Decision
on April 10, 2002, being fully advised in the premises, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were initially married on May 24, 1980, and two children

were born as issue of that marriage. The parties were divorced for the first time
pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce entered on July 18, 1994.
2.

The original decree of divorce awarded to the petitioner the home of the

parties, subject to the indebtedness thereon; the furniture and fixtures; and two vehicles
in her possession. The respondent was awarded any other interest the parties had in
real estate, including the Alaska property, subject to the indebtedness thereon. The
respondent was also awarded the vehicle in his possession, certain furniture and
fixtures, and his stock in DSI International, Inc. ("DSP) together with any interest the
parties had in that company.
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3.

The original decree awarded the petitioner $1,000.00 per month child

support, and $1,000.00 per month alimony. The alimony was to be terminated in three
years, upon remarriage of the petitioner, or by operation of law, whichever occurred
first.
4.

Following the original decree of divorce, the parties immediately entered

into a common law marital relationship. They continued to act just as they had before
the decree was entered. The children were not told of the divorce. The parties filed
joint income tax returns in 1994, and continued to hold themselves out as a married
couple. The respondent continued to provide the petitioner with approximately
$7,500.00 per month to meet family expenses, just as he had done prior to the decree
being entered. None of the titles to the property awarded in the decree were ever
changed until the parties began having difficulty in 1996.
5.

During the course of the common law marriage, the petitioner acquired

no additional property. The real property awarded to the petitioner in the original
divorce decree was thereafter her separate property. However, during the period of the
common law marriage, petitioner's home appreciated in value, and the principal due on
the home was reduced by payments on the mortgage made from monies of the marital
estate. During the trial on remand, however, the parties stipulated that the respondent
would waive any claim to that increase in equity in exchange for the petitioner's paying
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the attorney fees owing to Ms. Louise Knauer that the respondent was previously
ordered to pay, and the Court approved that stipulation.
6.

While the evidence at the original trial suggested that the DSI stock had

some value, it was impossible to ascertain that value because of DSI's substantial debt
structure, and with DSI's purchase of the Mathews Company, its liabilities far exceeded
its receivables. The settling of the F & D lawsuit, which provided some $1.3 million in
settlement to DSI, did not substantially change that, inasmuch as DSI invested that
money in a new venture to develop high-end residential property. Thus, significant debt
over and above the settlement amount still existed. The only real value that DSI has is
its good will value, which value is best reflected in the fact that the Elga Company was
willing to loan $25,000 to the respondent using the respondent's remaining stock in DSI
as collateral, to enable the respondent to gain release of his passport from the Office of
Recovery Services, State of Utah. When the respondent defaulted on the loan, the
stock was defaulted to Elga. The Court finds that the value of DSI's good will at the
time of the original decree of divorce in 1994 was $25,000.00, which is essentially the
same value that the good will would have had in 1998, when the stock was defaulted.
7.

In July, 1996, the respondent purchased, in his own name, certain

property in Park City, Utah, known as the Bear Hollow property. The property was titled
in respondent's name alone. The respondent obtained a loan of $250,000.00 in his
name on the Bear Hollow property from Olympus Holdings, Ltd., in 1997. He used the
Page 4

$250,000.00 to begin construction on the Bear Hollow property and to pay various other
personal expenses.
8.

Olympus Holdings, Ltd. ("Olympus"), was a Washington corporation

created for the purpose of facilitating a loan to the respondent. The money for the loan
came from a Mr. Charles Walch and certain unnamed investors in Switzerland. It was a
high-interest loan carrying approximately 18 percent interest. The respondent, along
with Mr. Fred Frink, facilitated the organization of Olympus, and both acted as officers
and directors. Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, also served as an agent for
Olympus.
9.

Subsequently, the respondent obtained a construction mortgage on the

Bear Hollow property from On Line Lending in the amount of $500,000.00 in his own
name. The Olympus loan was subordinated to the On Line loan, so that the On Line
loan took first position on the Bear Hollow property.
10.

After this time, DSI also invested large sums in the development of the

Bear Hollow property. DSI filed a lien against the Bear Hollow property and
subsequently brought an action against the parties herein, Olympus, and others,
seeking to determine the priority of the numerous claims on the property, DSI
International, Ind. v. Wayne Kelley, etal., Civil No. 980700264 (3rd Dist Ct. Utah,
Summit County), and that case remains pending.
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11.

In the Spring, 1999, the Bear Hollow property was sold. From the

proceeds of sale, the loan to On Line Lending was paid off, and also a check was
issued to Olympus to pay off its mortgage on the property. That check was issued to
Elaine Gerber, a friend of the respondent, in the amount of $361,146.00 in April, 1999,
and sent to her address in Texas, where she was residing with the respondent. She, in
turn, endorsed the check over to Walch Investments, the company of Mr. Charles
Walch, who provided some of the money for the initial loan from Olympus on the Bear
Hollow property.
12.

No portion of the $361,146.00, referred to in paragraph 11, above, was

property of the respondent, and thus no portion of that amount was a marital asset.
13.

Certain funds from the proceeds of sale of the Bear Hollow property

remain in escrow and are held by the Court in that proceeding pending a determination
of the interests of DSI and the other parties to that litigation in the Bear Hollow property.
14.

Whatever interest the petitioner or the respondent may have in the

proceeds from the sale of the Bear Hollow property is a marital asset of the parties
herein.
15.

During the course of the common law marriage, respondent purchased

certain furniture and fixtures for the Bear Hollow property from marital assets.
16.

The furniture purchased by the respondent during the course of the

common law marriage consisted of the following:
Page 6

Item

Purchase
Price

Disposition

Girls canopy bed
Girls matching chest
Girls matching night stand
Girls matching desk & vanity
Twin bed
Twin bed
Twin bed
Twin bed
Twin bed
King bed
King bed
Sofa
Sofa
Love Seat
Easy Chair
Easy Chair
Antique Table
Dining Table
Chest of Drawers
Chest of Drawers
Chest of Drawers
Chest of Drawers
Chest of Drawers
Chest of Drawers

$ 900.00
$ 800.00
$ 350.00
$ 600.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$3,500.00
$1,200.00
$1,000.00
$ 750.00
$ 750.00
$5,000.00
$7,500.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00
$1,000.00

1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful,
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful,
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful,
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful,
1995 Maple Ridge, Bountiful,
Lost in move
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow
Sold with 2325 Bear Hollow
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Respondent retained
Damaged beyond repair

17.

UT
UT
UT
UT
UT

In September, 1995, as a result of his work on the F & D lawsuit for

DSI, the Board of Directors of DSI gave the respondent a bonus in the range of
$120,000.00. The respondent elected to take the bonus in the form of a new MercedesBenz 600 SL. The respondent ordered the vehicle for delivery in Europe.
18.

In September, 1996, the respondent went to Germany to pick up the

vehicle, which was paid for by DSI. The purchase order was made out in respondent's
Page 7

name alone. He brought the car back to the United States and drove it for a period of
time. In the Summer, 1998, the respondent sold the vehicle to Mr. Fred Frink, a
business associate, for $95,000.00. The vehicle was titled in the respondent's name in
Alaska at the time of the sale to Mr. Frink. The respondent signed a bill of sale in his
own name on the vehicle to Mr. Frink. Mr. Frink paid the respondent $50,000.00 in
cash, and signed a promissory note dated June 1, 1998, in favor of the respondent
personally, for $45,000.00. At no time did any paperwork in conjunction with the
vehicle ever indicate that it belonged to anyone other than the respondent.
19.

The testimony of the respondent with respect to the Mercedes-Benz

600 SL was not credible. The value of the vehicle, representing a bonus paid to the
respondent during the course of the common law marriage, was $95,000.00.
20.

In 1996, Ms. Teresa Turner purchased an E-Class Mercedes-Benz

automobile. The Respondent arranged for the purchase of the vehicle and provided a
certified check to the dealer for the purchase price of approximately $30,000.00. Of that
amount, $20,000.00 was provided by Ms. Turner as part of an inheritance she received
from her aunt. The balance of $10,000.00 was provided by the respondent, but was a
repayment by the respondent of a loan made to him in the amount of $10,000.00 by Ms.
Turner at the time she sold her prior vehicle.
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21.

In 1998, the respondent arranged for the purchase of a 1998

Oldsmobile for Ms. Elaine Gerber, to be picked up in Illinois in her name and with her
money.
22.

In 1998, the respondent purchased an engagement ring for Ms. Gerber

for approximately $24,000.00. He paid twenty percent down and agreed to pay the
balance in one year, with interest. The balance owing on the ring after payment of the
down payment approximated the value of the ring.
23.

Any interest which the respondent owns in Omega Oil is speculative, at

24.

The parties herein had been married for a total of fourteen years when

best.

the original decree of divorce was entered in July, 1994. As part of the original decree,
the parties stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month, and
alimony of $1,000.00 per month. The alimony was to terminate in three years, upon the
petitioners' death or remarriage, or by operation of law, whichever first occurred. At the
time of the original decree, the petitioner had not worked outside the home since the
time of her marriage in 1980. She had no income. Her expenses during the course of
the common law marriage far exceeded the $2,000.00 per month provided in the
decree. Her house payment alone, without considering any other expenses, was
$2,400.00 per month. The respondent had been providing her approximately $7,500.00
per month to meet family expenses.
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25.

The provisions of the 1994 decree were clearly inadequate as

evidenced by the parties continued actions. They continued to reside together in a
common law relationship just as though no decree had ever been entered. The
respondent continued to provide support to petitioner and the children in the amount in
excess of $7,000.00 per month, just as he had before. The petitioner and the children
continued in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. It was not until after
the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things changed.
26.

Subsequently, the Commissioner established temporary support and

alimony of $6,000.00 per month. At trial, based upon the petitioner's gross income of
$1,486.00 per month, and respondent's historical income of $10,000.00 per month, and
in light of the expenses of the parties, the Court set child support at $2,000.00 per
month and alimony at $3,000.00 per month.
27.

The parties have been married continually, in either a solemnized

marriage or a common law marriage, from 1980 through July of 1999, more than
eighteen years.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-16.1 (1969).
2.

Any allocation of the parties property acquired during the term of the

common law marriage requires a systematic approach wherein the Court categorizes
Page 10

that property as part of the marital estate or as separate property belonging to one or
the other of the parties. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3.

Each party is presumed to be entitled to his or her own separate property

and fifty percent of the marital property, absent exceptional circumstances justifying a
different result. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

The DSI stock was the separate property of the respondent and, in any

event, the value of that stock did not increase during the term of the common law
marriage. There are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the
presumption that the value of the DSI stock, as the respondent's separate property,
should be awarded to the respondent.
5.

The property known as the Bear Hollow property was purchased by the

respondent during the term of the common law marriage and, to whatever extent either
party herein owned any interest in the Bear Hollow property (which is presently in
dispute in the Summit County litigation), the proceeds of sale are a marital asset. There
are no exceptional circumstances justifying any departure from the presumption that the
proceeds of the sale of the Bear Hollow property, to whatever extent either party owned
an interest therein, as a marital asset, should be awarded equally to the parties herein.
6.

No portion of the funds used by Elaine Gerber to pay off the Olympus

loan was the property of the respondent, and those funds were neither a marital asset
nor his own separate property, but belonged to a third party.
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7.

The antique table and dining room table identified in Finding of Fact No.

16 above, were fixtures sold with the Bear Hollow property, and the value of those
assets is reflected in the sales price of that property. Thus, the parties' interest in those
assets will be determined by the outcome of the litigation presently pending in Summit
County, Utah. Whatever interest, if any, the parties may have in the proceeds of the
sale of the Bear Hollow property should be awarded equally to the parties as set forth in
Conclusion o f Law No. 4, above.
8.

The other items identified in Finding of Fact No. 16 above, with the

exception of the first four items listed, are marital assets which normally would be
distributed equally between the parties. However, exceptional circumstances justify an
award of these items to the respondent, in light of his obligation to pay the marital debts
incurred during the course of the common law marriage. As to the first four items listed,
these were gifts to the respondent's daughter, and those items belong to her and are
neither marital assets nor the separate assets of either of the parties herein.
9.

As to the Mercedes-Benz 600 SL, the value of that vehicle was a bonus

paid to the respondent during the course of the common law marriage, and thus the
value of that vehicle is a marital asset. No exceptional circumstances justify any
departure from the presumption that, as a marital asset, the value of that asset should
be divided equally between the parties.
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10.

As to the E-Class Mercedes Benz purchased by Teresa Turner, while

$10,000.00 of the purchase price was provided by the respondent, those funds
represent the repayment of a loan to Ms. Turner which is not a marital asset, but
represent the respondent's separate property. No exceptional circumstances justify any
departure from the presumption that, as his separate property, those funds should be
awarded to the respondent.
11.

As to the engagement ring purchased by the respondent for Ms. Elaine

Gerber, the Court finds that the balance due on the ring, with interest, would
approximate the value of the ring, and thus the ring has no value as a marital asset.
12.

As to the respondent's interest in Omega Oil, the Court finds that any

such interest is speculative, at best, but is in any event the separate property of the
respondent.

No exceptional circumstances justify any departure from the presumption

that, as his separate property, his interest in Omega Oil, whatever it may be, should be
awarded to the respondent.
13.

Based upon (1) the long duration of the parties' marriage; (2) the

standard of living to which the petitioner and the parties' children have become
accustomed (which was encouraged by the respondent); (3) the needs of the petitioner
and her inability to make more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) the respondent's
ability to make substantially more than the petitioner, the Court finds these extenuating
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circumstances to justify the Court in extending alimony beyond the term of the common
law marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1999).
DATED this jfe*^ day of Mdy, 2002.

BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S) PAGE

•

Second Judicial District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

M^JCtsL* Ul.

GJ^A_J

Martin W. Custen
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit 2. Judgment

JFlLffi
FILED J
JUL 2 9 2002

JUL 15 2002
SECOND
DISTRICTCOURT

James C. Haskins (#1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, f.C.
SECOND
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
DISTRICT COUflT
357 South 200 East, Suite 30F
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY (DIVISION I)
STATE OF UTAH
SOMA KELLEY,

JUDGMENT
Petitioner,

vs.
Civil No. 944700827
WAYNE KELLEY,
Respondent.

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Remand from the Court of Appeals, it is now hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1

The parties have stipulated that the respondent makes no claim to the

appreciation on the petitioner's residence during the term of the common law marriage,
and any and all such appreciation is hereby awarded to the petitioner;
2,

The petitioner is awarded one-half of any interest owned by her or by the

respondent in the Bear Hollow property;

JUDGMENT ENTERED
l6tJ\

3.

The respondent is awarded all furnishings purchased by him for the Bear

Hollow property, with the exception of those items gifted to his minor daughter, which
items belong to her;
4.

The petitioner is awarded judgment in the amount of one-half the value

of the respondent's Mercedes-Benz 600 SL, in the sum of $47,500.00;
5.

The respondent shall pay alimony to the petitioner at the rate of

$3,000.00 per month from December, 1998 for a period often years, or until the
remarriage or death of the petitioner, whichever occurs first; and
6.

Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees, and shall

hold the other party harmless therefrom.
DATED this ^ S ^ d a y of jy^y, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

R O D N E Y ^ PAGE
Second Judicial District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Martin W. Custen
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit 3. August 16, 2001 Bench Trial Transcript, pp. 142-146

understanding?
MS. KELLEY:

Yes, it is, sir.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

You may be seated.

Mr. Kelley, will you please stand.
same representation.

You've heard the

Did you understand that?

MR. KELLEY:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And are you willing to be bound by that

stipulation?
MR. KELLEY:

Yes, I am.

THE COURT:

You may be seated, then.

And the Court will accept the stipulation of the
parties, find that in consideration of Mrs. Kelley's assuming
any obligation owing to Louis Knauer as a result of attorneys
fees incurred in this matter, Mr. Kelley has relinquished any
claim for any increased equity which have accrued in the
Bountiful home between the years of 1994 and.the time the
decree was entered in the latest divorce.

That will be the

order of the Court.
You may proceed.
MR. HASKINS:

Thank you, your Honor.

We would call

Ms. Kelley.
THE COURT:

Ms. Kelley, would you step up, please.

If you'd raise your right hand and be sworn.
SONIA K. KELLEY,
having been first duly sworn, called

142

1

at the instance of the petitioner, testified

2

upon her oath as follows:

3

DIRECT EXAMINATION

4 I BY MR. HASKINS:
5
6

Q

Sonia, would you state your full name for the record,

please?

7

A

Sonia K. Kelley.

8

Q

And your current address?

9

A

1995 South Maple Ridge Drive in Bountiful.

10

Q

Sonia, have you purchased any furniture since 1994?

11

A

No, I have not.

12

Q

You are currently unemployed; is that correct?

13 I

A

14 I

Q

15
16 J
17
18 J
19

Yes.
For the summer.

And you — are you going to be

seeking employment soon?
A

Yes, I will in the fall.

I stopped working in June,

and I'll.work again in the fall.
Q

Do you have —
MR. CUSTEN:

20

present work status.

21

THE COURT:

Your Honor, just relevance of her

I'm sure it has something to do with her

22

ability and whether there are any extenuating circumstances

23

that may apply to the alimony issue.

24

objection for whatever weight it might have.

25

MR. CUSTEN:

I'll overrule the

Okay.
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Q

(BY MR. HASKINS)

Sonia, currently to have any

ability to pay your attorneys fees?
A

No.

Q

How much were you billed for prosecuting the appeal

in this particular case?
MR. CUSTEN:

Objection, your Honor.

There were no

fees awarded on appeal.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. HASKINS:

Well, I'm not sure that was the case.

I thought it was remanded for THE COURT:

It was remanded for this matter, but no

attorneys fees were awarded.
MR. HASKINS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

I misread that, then.

At least as I recall.

MR. CUSTEN:

Now -

Mr. Kelley was the - he obtained the

reversal, so —
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. CUSTEN:
THE COURT:

- I'm pretty sure.
We'll check that out anyway.

MR. HASKINS:
Q

All right.

(BY MR. HASKINS)

In any event, do you have any

ability to pay your attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting this
matter?
A

No.
MR. HASKINS:

That's all I have, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Cross-examine?

2

MR. HASKINS:

[Unintelligible] I will submit my

3

affidavit for the attorneys fees that have been incurred after

4

we've concluded preparing our response.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CUSTEN:

Is that your agreement in this matter?
It is, provided I can submit mine.

7

We're not asking for a fee award, your Honor, but I always

8

feel -

9

THE COURT:

[Unintelligible] present it.

10

MR. CUSTEN:

Yeah.

11

didn't work for free.

Just the Court understands I

12

THE COURT: All right.

13

MR. CUSTEN:

14

I know there's a popular misconception

concerning it.

15

THE COURT:

I don't know who holds it, but -

I
16

MR. CUSTEN:

17 I
18

Yeah.

None of my clients hold it.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CUSTEN:

19

Q

Sonia, you do receive $5,000 a month from Wayne?

20

A

Yes.

21 |

Q

And you were — the judge found that you were capable

22

of earning $1,458 per month gross, correct?

23

A

Yes, yes.

24

Q

And the judge found at the time Wayne — that these

25

figures were based on imputing earnings to Wayne of $10,000 per
145

1 I month.
2 I

A

Is that your recollection?
I think so.

3 I

MR. CUSTEN:

That's all I have.

4 I

THE COURT:

5

MR. HASKINS:

6

THE COURT:

7 I

MR. CUSTEN:

You may step down.

Rebuttal?
No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You don't mean to tell me we're done?

MS. KELLEY:

We're done?

MR. HASKINS:
MR. CUSTEN:

We rest, your Honor.

We're done.
Mr. Kelley would really - is it the

Court's preference that we — I don't know.
for a long time.

I know the Court

If you feel closing is helpful, tell us.

If

not —
THE COURT:
at this point.

Let me indicate it would not be helpful

As requested by counsel, I'm going to allow you

to submit your arguments by written memorandum.

And if in fact

you want to appear and make some oral argument relative to
those matters, I would be willing to do that.

But I don't

think argument at this point is going to help.
MR. CUSTEN:

And that's fine.

to try to make a 5:00 o'clock plane.

Mr. Kelley would like

Is the Court going to put

a limit on how long the — how lengthy the memoranda —
THE COURT:

I am not.

I'll give you limit on when I

want them back.
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